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"KNOWN GENERALLY AS CORPORATE SECURITIES"
ALBERT S. ABEL*S ECTION 1801 of the Internal Revenue Code provides for a tax
"on all bonds, debentures, or certificates of indebtedness issued by
any corporation, and all instruments, however termed, issued by any
corporation with interest coupons or in registered form, known generally
as corporate securities." Language can hardly be imagined better cal-
culated at once to require and to baffle construction as to what instru-
ments other than corporate bonds, debentures, and certificates of indebt-
edness are subject to tax. Patently the provision does not admit of appli-
cation according to its grammatical construction for what corporation
is there "with interest coupons" or what corporation "in registered
form," as specified by the language quoted, and, if such could be found,
who could reasonably suppose an intention to limit the operation of the
legislation to such an odd creature? Again, the limitation to bonds, de-
bentures, and certificates of indebtedness "issued by any corporation"
seems clearly provided if anything is by this rhetorical hodgepodge;
but if the limitation to instruments of corporate provenance is to apply
throughout the entire section, why state it in the middle of the stream,
and, on the other hand, if it is not, what effect shall be given to the
second "issued by any corporation"?
Had the section been struck off at a given time by the hand and the
mind of man, one would be driven to attribute its stylistic peculiarities to
whimsy or to drink; but, coming as it has as a stage in an evolutionary
process, some understanding of how it got that way (although not neces-
sarily of what it means) can be gained from tracing its history. Appear-
ing as set forth in the Revenue Act of 19262 and since, it replaced a
section in the Revenue Act of 19243 similar in all respects except that it
taxed bonds, debentures, and certificates of indebtedness "issued by any
person;"4 the narrowing was effected in conference at the instance of
the Senate conferees5 and would seem to have contemplated that, as to
those three classes of instruments, a corporate issuer was requisite to tax
liability; what was intended as to those falling within the remainder of
the section, nil constat. The provision of the Revenue Act of 1924, in its
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 See the somewhat plaintive recognition of the "obstacle" occasioned by "the
presence of a grammatical error in the act of Congress" in Fidelity Trust Co. v.
Lederer, 276 Fed. 51, 54 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
244 STAT. 101 (1926).
843 STAT. 333 (1924).
' Italics supplied.
5 See United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 752, 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
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turn, was copied from that of the Revenue Act of 1921, ' which was iden-
tical with one in the Revenue Act of 1919,? where, however, the provi-
sion had appeared with a companion section requiring stamp taxes to
be annexed to "Bonds, indemnity and surety" without mention of
corporations,8 which section was repealed by the Act of 1921. The Act
of 1918 had for the first time added the clause relating to "all instru-
ments, however termed, issued by any corporation with interest coupons
or in registered form, known generally as corporate securities" to the
provisions for taxing bonds, debentures, and certificates of indebtedness
and, as to these latter, had imposed liability when they were "issued by
any person" in contrast with the Revenue Act of 1917" which spoke in
terms of their issue "by any person, corporation, partnership, or associ-
ation."
Such has been the meandering course of this provision 0 with the
further complication that the section heading "Bonds of indebtedness"
appearing in the Act of 1926 and theretofore was metamorphosed in the
Internal Revenue Code to the present heading "corporate securities!'
All this rather tedious recital of the steps by which the present language
developed serves well enough perhaps to dissipate any blame for its
literary defects; but how far it discloses any consistent evolutionary pat-
tern as an aid to construction is something else again. True, inference can
be drawn as to what each several step was meant to accomplish; indeed
they are extremely complaisant both individually and in the aggregate
and will support a host of inferences of the most conflicting character.
Of its history as of its grammar, one can make almost anything which, of
course, means one can make almost nothing. Such situations are pre-
eminently adapted to the technique of judicial construction of which
this provision has received plenty.'1
842 STAT. 303 (1921).
40 STAT. 1135 (1919).
8 "2. Bonds, indemnity and surety: On all bonds executed for indemnifying
any person who shall have become bound or engaged as surety, and on all bonds
executed for the due execution 'or performance of any contract, obligation, or re-
quirement, or the duties of any office or position, and to account for money re-
ceived by virtue thereof, and on all policies of guaranty and fidelity insurance,
including policies guaranteeing titles to real estate and mortgage guarantee
policies, and on all other bonds of any description, made, issued, or executed, not
otherwise provided for in this schedule, except such as may be required in legal
proceedings.. "
940 STAT. 321 (1917).
10 See the discussion of statutory history in Lawyers' Mortgage Co. v. Anderson,
67 F. (2d) 889, 891,892 ((. C. A. 2d, 1933).
"1 They would seem also to be adapted to the technique of interpretative regula-
tions; but of this, as will appear more fully, infra page 20, the provision has re-
ceived little.
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The United States Supreme Court has not yet spoken as to the
meaning of section 1801; but its decision construing the very similar
provision of the Revenue Act of 1919 in Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Com-
pany'2 to hold railroad equipment trust certificates "instruments ...
known generally as corporate securities" and the trustee liable for a
stamp tax on such certificates must be deemed and has been accepted 3
as a direct authority on the meaning of section 1801. Counsel for the
trustee had relied largely on the proposition that the phrase referred
exclusively to instruments embodying or evidencing a debtor-creditor
relationship between the corporation and the holder,"4 a relationship
not created by equipment trust certificates under which the holder's
interest is analytically that of equitable owner rather than creditor, and
on the threadbare generality that tax statutes are not to be extended by
implication beyond the clear import of the language used.'5 This ap-
proach was successful in the circuit court of appeals'6 which apparently
felt that Congress should put beyond the need for construction the tax
liability of any instruments it desired to reach; but the Supreme Court
took a less mechanical view, expressed in the somewhat cryptic opinion
by Mr. Justice Holmes, who, after defining the issue as "whether the
certificates are instruments issued &c, known generally as corporate
securities"' 1 said
The petitioner asks us fo look through the form of the arrange-
ment and give it a somewhat different meaning. The respondent on
12 267 U. S. 17, 45 S. Ct. 206, 69 L. ed. 494 (1925).
18 See, inter alia, WilIcuts v. Investors' Syndicate, 57 F. (2d) 811, 814 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1932) ; Mortgage Guarantee Co. v. Welch, 38 F. (2d) 184, 185 (C. C. A.
9th, 1930). But see Fidelity Investment Ass'n v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 333, 342,
5 F. Supp. 19,23 (1933).
" The court reporter thus summarizes the argument of counsel for respondent
taxpayer, 267 U. S. 17, 19, 20: "The equipment certificate here taxed is not a
certificate of indebtedness or a corporate security. It is not the obligation of a
corporation to pay money owing by it, nor does it evidence an indebtedness secured
on the property of a corporation. It is a mere declaration of trust and defines the
holder's ownership of the equipment leased to the railroad company and the extent
of his interest in the moneys to be received as rental therefor. Neither the railroad
company nor the trust company is indebted to the certificate holders . . .The
certificate is merely the evidence of the holder's equitable ownership of an undi-
vided interest in the equipment leased to the railroad company and the rentals
payable therefor. How, then, can such muniments of title be termed 'corporate
securities'?" (Italics supplied.)
Is Id. at 20.
10 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Lederer, 289 Fed. 1009, 1012 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923). ("It
will thus be seen that, when the transaction is viewed as a whole, as must be the
case, and the certificate in question measured from that standpoint, no indebted-
ness is involved or obligation incurred by the trustee to the holder, but it is simply
a certificate of the holder's right to proportionate participation in a rental when
paid . .. It would seem that Congress, had it intended taxing (car trust certifi-
cates), would have so covered them by specific designation, or by proper generic
description, as to leave no question of its intent.")
17 267 U. S. 20, 45 S. Ct. 206, 69 L. ed. 495.
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the other hand says in the language of United States v. Isham...
"whatever upon its face (the instrument) purports to be, that it is
for the purpose of ascertaining the stamp duty." We are content to
adopt the respondent's rule for this case, as upon any rule the result
seems to us clear.
As a matter of common speech, to which the statute refers, we
have no doubt that these instruments would be known as corporate
securities. They would be called so more accurately than some other
documents which we believe also would be known generally by that
name. Their purpose, as stated in the agreement of the trustee with
the railroad, is to secure payment to the holder with interest. They
do nothing else. We do not regard the precise limits of the Trust
Company's undertaking as important. If it were only to collect and
pay money received by the Company under the secured contract of
the Railroad it would be a security for money payment. But the
counsel for the Company seemed not prepared to argue that the
Company could not put the money received from the Railroad into
its general account without a breach of trust, and give the certificate
holder cash or a check for his interest or principal. But be the under-
taking greater or less, the security better or worse, we cannot regard
these certificates as anything but corporate securities by general
understanding and in fact. 8
Somewhere in this language and in the significant silences of this
opinion, the lower federal courts have to find virtually9 all the guidance
from higher authority available for the construction of the provision.
There has been little administrative assistance. While Regulation 71 in
its original form devoted twenty-one sections to the elucidation of section
1801, most of them were concerned with what should be deemed "bonds"
or "certificates of indebtedness" and only two20 dealt with the amor-
phous "instruments, however termed... known generally as corporate
securities." One2' so categorized the equipment trust certificates which
were the subject of suit in Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Company. The
other22 dealt similarly with "business property investment bond(s),"
13 Id. at 21, 22, 45 S. Ct. 207, 69 L. ed. 495.
19 True, there have beep denials of certiorari in certain other cases arising under
the section, almost invariably without specification of the grounds for denial, how-
ever; and he would be a bold man indeed who attempted to erect much of a struc-
ture of reasoning on implications from such action. Cf. Griswold, Book Review
(1935) 48 HtAv. L. Rzv. 1037, 1038.
20 Two others declare that certificates of deposit in banks and instruments
representing an assignment of interest in a bond secured by a mortgage are not
taxable, thus inferentially holding transactions of the type specified not to be
"known generally as corporate securities."
21 U. S. Treas. Reg. 71, art. 13 (1932) ("Car trust certificates on the so-called
Philadelphia plan are 'corporate securities,' within the meaning of the Act, and
are subject to payment of the stamp tax on bonds of indebtedness.")
22 U. S. Treas. Reg. 71, art. 16 ("A business property investment bond wherein
it is certified that the holder thereof is the owner of an interest in certain specified
property, legal title to which has previously been conveyed to a trustee, and
whereby the corporation issuing the same agrees to manage the property and
4
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thus accepting as to them the result of the majority of lower federal
court holdings. The later revision of the Regulation makes even briefer
reference to the matter, its contribution (if such it can be called) being
lirpned pretty much to an uninformative paraphrase of the statutory
piraseology. 23 So little influence, indeed, has administrative regulation
aad in this field that in only two instances2- has any reference to it in the
opinions been found. There may be few places left in our present in-
tricately meshed tax system for judicial development of doctrine by case
law; but here, it would seem, we have one of them.
'The characteristic feature of the equipment trust is the establish-
ment of a specific res (consisting of railroad rolling stock), the proprietor-
ship interest in which is evidenced by a number of instruments (entitled
equipment trust certificates) in amounts conveniently adapted to in-
vestment purposes, which are marketed among a group of persons not
otherwise sustaining any special business relationship with one another
and not proposing to engage in any common enterprise except the receipt
of income from the res, which is and which it is contemplated will con-
tinue to be used by others, subject to a contract yielding a regular re-
turn to the certificate holders. The formation of the income yielding
contracts, the distribution of the proprietorship interest by marketing
distribute the proceeds in a certain manner, is not subject to tax as a bond, deben-
ture, or certificate of indebtedness, but is subject to tax as a certificate of interest
in property issued by a corporation.") But cf. the provisions of U. S. Treas. Reg.
art. 56(h) quoted infra note 23.
22 U. S. Treas. Reg. 71, art. 55 (1942) ("Issues subject to tax. Ordinarily, a
corporate instrument styled a bond, debenture, or certificate of indebtedness is
subject to the tax. However, the taxability of an instrument is not determined by
the name alone but depends upon all the circumstances, such as the name, form,
and terms of the instrument, etc. Hence, an instrument, however designated,
having all the essential characteristics of a bond, debenture, or certificate of
indebtedness is taxable as such. Similarly, an instrument issued with interest cou-
pons, or with provision for registration, and coming within the class known gen-
erally as corporate securities will be hed subject to the tax regardless of the name
by which it may be called. The following are examples of corporate instrumentstaxable upon issue: ... (e) Equipment trust certificates. (f) Scrip-dividend cer-
tificates. (g) Any of the obligations described in section 1801, issued on or afterOctober 22, 1942, by any receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee, or other person,
having custody of property, or charge of the affairs, of any corporaton.")Id. art 56 ("Issues not subject to tax. In addition to the various issues specific-
ally exempt under section 1808, as to which see Subpart J, the following are
examples of instruments not taxable upon issue: (a) An instrument issued by anindividual . . . (h) A business property investment certificate wherein it is cer-
tified that the holder thereof is the owner of an interest in certain specifiedproperty, legal title to which has previously been conveyed to a trustee, and
whereby the issuing corporation agrees to manage the property and distribute theproceeds. However, such an instrument is subject to the issue tax imposed by
section 1802(a) .. 
-
2 Se General Motors Acceptance Corp. sr. Higgins, 60 F. Supp. 979, 982(S. D . Y. 1945) ; Bellefield Co. v. Heiner, 25 F. (2d) 560, 563 (C. C. A. 3d,
1928).
5
Abel: Known Generally as Corporate Securities
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1946
CORPORATE SECURITIES
the certificates, and all the managerial details of receiving and distrib-
uting the income and supervising the arrangements with the railroad on
the one hand and the certificate holders on the other are undertaken by
a corporate intermediary, usually styled a trustee, coMpensated for such
services by marketing commissions, managerial commissions, or both.
The plan is devised to make costly equipment immediately available to
the railroad without a pledge of its general credit or the assumption of
liabilities other than those nominally attributable to current use, to per-
mit individuals with available funds to invest them in a curious sim-
ulacrum of entrepreneurship largely stripped (or believed to. be
stripped) of the risk of fluctuating return, characteristic of that status
in its more usual form of partnership or of corporate stockholding, and
to enable the intermediary to preserve and cultivate advantageous fin-
ancing relations with the railroad on the one hand and the certificate
holders on the other, to be remunerated for its services, and at the same
time to undertake no liabilities except those arising from its general
obligations as fiduciary.25
Such a plan, while of obvious advantage to railroads, is not limited
in its appeal to that single situation. Given a group of potential investors
who want concurrently the postulated security of principal which at-
taches to ownership and the assurance of a level effortless income return
which is lacking with the orthodox forms of proprietorship, a res homo-
geneous enough and large enough to invite the splitting of ownership into
a number of standard and easily marketable portions, and a financial
institution unable or unwilling to commit its own funds indefinitely as
advances on account of such res but willing to serve as sponsoring inter-
mediary and manager, of such prestige among investors that, in reliance
on its sponsorship and management, without any specific assumption of
liability by it, they are willing to advance the value of the res in return
for fractional ownership shares therein, an arrangement analogous to the
equipment trust is a perfectly natural development. The peculiarity of
the resultant enterprise is that it engenders claims arising out of the
activity of the sponsoring institution which involve no element of stock-
holding in that or any other corporation nor yet in any undertaking by
it to repay the amount invested; so that the corporation which generates
the investment and which continues to exercise management has issued
neither stock, bonds, debentures, or anything which can strictly be called
corporate indebtedness.
25 For a comprehensive pioneer study of the car equipment trust device, see
Rawle, Car Trust Securities (1885) A. B. A. RzF. 277.
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The conditions supposed have been most frequently presented, aside
from the car equipment trust, in connection with mortgage participation
schemes. This type of arrangement, although it has by now attained a
considerable age and degree of standardization, has received but little
methodical consideration in legal literature and that usually in consid-
eration with the position of investors26 rather than that of the institution
distributing the participation certificates and undertaking managerial
functions. It presents all the financial attributes noted in the preceding
paragraphs, however, and, subject to statutory and judicial limitations,2T
has had a fairly widespread use as an investment outlet, especially in
flush times. Issues of such participation certificates were not uncommon
in the late '20s, resulting in the decision of stamp tax liabilities in the un-
happier '30s; and it may be expected that this experience is about to
repeat itself, so that those tax determinations are of current importance.
The major fact difference between the car equipment trust and the
mortgage participation lies in the character of the res which consists as
to the former of rolling stock, as to the latter of pooled mortgages on
realty. In both, "ownership" interests in the res are split into shares of
standard denominations which are serially issued to investors desiring to
participate. The issuing and managing institution characteristically has
a rather more intimate relation to the res in the mortgage participation
plan, to the extent that it, usualli either through a subsidiary or through
its parent financial corporation, will have initially acquired the constit-
uent mortgages as part of its own investment portfolio. Such mortgages
are then transferred either in a block or by designation in a transaction
between parent and subsidiary or, if the parent-subsidiary device is not
employed, are made subject to a declaration of trust pari passu, with the
distribution of participation certificates to investors. Under established
variations, such certificates represent sometimes an undifferentiated
fractional interest in the pooled mortgages, sometimes a fractional inter-
est in specific constituent mortgages as to which the investors might and
occasionally do exercise a degree of discriminating choice; on the latter
side, the arrangement shades into outright mortgage assignment, which
indeed the financing institution sometimes offers prospective investors as
an alternative option to mortgage participation. Some form of mortgage
guarantee by itself or mortgage insurance by an authorized independent
insurer may be offered as a further assurance to investors; or there may be
26 1 GLENN MORTGAGES (1943) §7; LORING, A TausTEE's HANDaOox (Shat-
tuck's rev. 1940) §60.
27 The best discussion of this phase of mortgage participations is found in Note,
Legality of Mortgage Participations as Trust Investments (1932) 41 YALz L. J.
455.
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no such provision and, indeed, the financing institution may expressly
absolve itself from any liability for principal or interest except as they
are received. Besides the intangible advantages from extending its finan-
cial influence and connections in the community, the institution fre-
quently profits by providing for distribution to the investors of slightly
less sums than those paid by the mortgagors as interest, the balance being
retained as a managerial commission.
That car equipment trust certificates should be held taxable, upon
the most perfunctory consideration, as "instruments... known generally
as corporate securities" in the single case 28 arising with respect to them
under the current Act will perhaps not astonish even those most easily
amazed, in the light of Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Company and Article
55 (e) of Treasury Regulation 71.20 It might well be assumed that a like
result would as easily be reached as to instruments issued under mortgage
participation arrangements in view of the essential identity between them
and car equipment trusts pointed out above so far as concerns the sub-
stantial rights and relative position of the parties. That is, indeed, the
result achieved after deliberation in the greater number of cases 0 where
the problem has arisen. However, the course of decision has not been
unanimous and authority exists3 ' in which the issuance of participating
certificates has been held not to give occasion for the payment of the
stamp tax. Differentiating circumstances were thought to exist as a result
of the investor's power of selection among mortgages3 2 and of detailed
provisions in the contract expressed by the certificate. Pretermitting con-
sideration of the logical validity of these suggested differentiations, it can
be said nevertheless that there are few, if any, of the supposed differen-
tiating features which could not equally be found in issues elsewhere held
subject to tax. The central fact to be noted is that instruments distributed
28 Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Rothen-
sLies, 146 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944).29 Supra note 23.80 United States v. American Trust & Banking Co., 125 F. (2d) 113 (C. C. A.
6th, 1942); Hamilton Nat. Bank v. United States, 99 F. (2d) 570 (C. C. A. 6th,
1938) affirming 14 F. Supp. 736 (D. Tenn. 1936); Motter v. Bankers Mortgage
Co., 93 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 568 (1938);
Lawyers' Mortgage Co. v. Anderson, 67 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), revers-
ing 1 F. Supp. 462 (S. D. N. Y. 1932) ; Title Guarantee &,Trust Co. v. Bowers,
67 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, 292 U. S. 628 (1934); Mort-
gage Guarantee Co. v . Welch, 38 F. (2d) 184 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930), cert. denied,
281 U. S. 759 (1930); National Commercial Title & Guaranty Co. v. Kelly, 39
F. Supp. 339 (D. N. J. 1941) (by implication).
101 Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 3d,
1935), reversing 9 F. Supp. 257 (M. D. Pa. 1935); Pennsylvania Co. for Insur-
ances on Lives and Granting Annuities v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 1019 (E. D.
Pa. 1941).
22 Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 895 (C. C. A. 3d,
1935).
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under mortgage participation schemes have been generally though not
unanimously deemed taxable on the ground that they are "known gen-
erally as corporate securities," thus putting them on the same tax footing
as the nearly parallel equipment trust certificates.
Attractive engraving and elaborate phraseology combined with a
nebulous proprietorship have no doubt proved a potent lure for invest-
ment hungry funds; but the proprietorship can be left out and a direct
promise of the issuer substituted without greatly lessening the appeal to
the classic widow-and-orphan market. There has resulted a proliferation
of instruments which present in each instance the question whether the
paper can be said to be "known generally as corporate securities," hence
taxable. The issuer, a corporation engaged in the business of advancing
funds to others--"managing investments," if you please-desires to in-
duce a continuing flow to itself of outside capital, to permit it to enlarge
its loans and obtain a return by the differential between the interest it
receives and that which it pays out. Technical considerations of financ-
ing procedure, arising from the short term character of the underlying
security, a desire for greater discretion and greater diversity as to avail-
able types of security, and the like, militate against the creation of a
floating proprietorship interest (a device indeed which seems to have
been largely confined to car equipment trusts and mortgage participa-
tions and which is ill-adapted to securing funds for investment in heter-
ogeneous or fluctuating securities). The alternative is an issue of instru-
ments bearing the direct promise of the issuer, coupled sometimes with
a reference to the existence of a trust to secure repayment but not pur-
porting to give the purchaser any direct proprietary interest in the res
or in any specific part of it. Frequently the instrument will bear some
such resounding title as "special interest contract," "special annuity
contract," "collateral trust secured thrift agreement," "accumulative
instalment certificate," or the like; but in each case it is in essence the
issuer's promise to repay in a manner specified the sum advanced plus
interest. While a corporate obligation, its dissimilarities from orthodox
bonds, debentures, and certificates of corporate indebtedness are too
many and too great to permit classification under those heads for tax
purposes.
As the general although not invariable tendency in connection with
the mutations from corporate stock represented by car equipment and
mortgage participation certificates was seen to be to hold them taxable
as "known generally as corporate securities," so it seems to be also as to
9
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these aberrant corporate obligations. In one case, 3 where an automobile
finance company marketed "notes" secured by its holdings of automobile
paper, thus in effect obtaining funds by a distributed discount of its
aggregate holdings of such paper, the court felt that such "notes" might
fairly be said to be "known generally as corporate securities,"'14 although
it thought them non-taxable on formal grounds because they were not
issued with coupons or in registered form.3 5 The typical transaction,
however, involves an instalment investment plan and an instrument by
which the issuer undertakes, in the event of a series of payments by in-
vestors, to repay after a certain time a stated principal sum in excess of
the amounts received or to make a series of income payments. Willcuts v.
Investors Syndicate6 and National Thrift Corporation v. Welch 7 held
the "accumulative instalment certificates" and "collateral trust secured
thrift certificates," respectively, issued pursuant to such a scheme to be
instruments "known generally as corporate securities" and taxable; and
this in the Investors Syndicate case although it affirmatively appeared
that there was no obligation assumed by the issuer at the time of issue,
such obligation being postponed until eighteen months had elapsed or
the purchaser had paid the second instalment on the contract. The only
clearly opposing authority is Fidelity Investment Association v. United
States,8 in which substantially" similar paper was found not to be within
the statutory description. While the instruments in City Bond & Finance
Company v. Welch'0 were also held non-taxable, the investors in that
case paid their instalments in contemplation of eventually getting title
to named securities, not in return for the issuer's undertaking to repay;
and the instruments in suit embodied rather a highly formalized method
for notation of receipt of partial payments on the purchase price than
any pledge either of the issuer's general credit or of a trust fund.
.88 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Higgins, 60 F. Supp. 979 (S. D..N. Y.
1945).
34 Id. at-983 ("I would say, without deciding the point, that these instruments
might well be termed generally 'corporate securities').
as Id. at 984.
36 57 F.-(2d) 811 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
39 56 F. (2d) 1077 (S. D:Cal. 1931).
38 79 Ct. Cl. 789, 5 F. Supp. 19 (1933).
39 In Willcuts v. Investors Syndicate and in National Thrift Corp. v. Welch,
the promise was to repay a sum certain, representing the amount of the instal-
ments paid in plus interest accruals, whereas in Fidelity Investment Ass'n v.
United States, the promise was for a series of "interest" or ,'annuity" payments,
being the earnings on account of a principal sum calculated as in the earlier two
cases; but no point of this difference in the manner of repayment is made in any
of the cases and it is believed that nothing turns on it. In other respects the con-
tracts are not distinguishable in substance.
'0 79 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935).
10
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The element of the procurement of funds from the investment seek-
ing public through a public distribution has been present in all cases thus
far considered. Normally it will be present and its presence may perhaps
lend weight to the conclusion that the instruments involved are "known
generally as corporate securities;" but there is no evident reason for
deeming its absence conclusive against that consequence.41 Whenever a
corporation proposes to obtain a line of credit from a bank under an
arrangement contemplating the issue or reissue of the borrower's
.corporate paper, to notice one frequent situation, the problem is poten-
tially, present. The reports disclose only two cases where it has been
passed on judicially-with divergent if not actually conflicting results.
Bellefield Company v. Heiner42 presented the situation where, as a con-
dition to procuring the requested line of credit, the corporation con-
veyed all its real property to a trustee to hold'as mortgage security and,
as the line of credit was used, endorsed to the bank4 the borrower's
"collateral mortgage notes" made to itself as payee in the same amount
as the bankable notes by which it utilized the credit extension. The
court, in an intrinsically unsatisfactory opinion wholly consistent with
the Third Circuit's penchant against taxability, held that such "collateral
mortgage notes" were not taxable since they were to be deemed "notes"
and not "bonds" under the formal rules distinguishing those two classes
of instruments; nothing is said in the opinion regarding their possible
taxability as instruments known generally as corporate securities." A
somewhat different situation and a far different judicial approach are
revealed in Royal Loan Company v. United States.45 There the corpora-
tion applying for a line of credit from a bank already had outstanding
in the hands of individuals a number of its notes; the bank as a condition
to extending the requested credit required that the antecedent notes be
62 Compare Wisconsin Public Service Corp. v. United States, 40 F. Supp. 327
(E.D. Wis. 1941) (holding subject to tax as "bonds.. .issued by any corporation"
a single "temporary bond" in the sum of $7,500,000 pledged, together with a
mortgage to secure a bank loan, pending contemdplated issue of a series of
"permanent bonds" of like amount and covering tihe same obligation whenever
the securities market should become more favorable for offerings).
12 25 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) reversing 26 F. (2d) 292 (W.D. Pa.
1928).43 There were in fact two banks which joined in extending a line of credit on
a mutually satisfactory basis; but this fact variation would seem to be immaterial.
"l The applicable statute was the Revenue Act of 1924,43 STAT. 333 (1924) in
which the provisions taxing instruments "known generally as corporate securi-
ties" appeared, although under a section heading "Bonds." The court does not
venture, naturally, upon a rationale that the text of the statute is to be disregarded
in favor of the section catchlines; at the same time, while quoting the statutory
language, 25 F. (2d) 561, the court entered upon no analysis of the terms but
discussed only the stigmata of bonds and notes respectively.
45 154 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 8th, 1946) affirming 61 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mo.
1945).
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made and kept subordinate to the bank's claim; the creditprs assenting,
that result was accomplished by calling in the outstanding notes and issu-
ing in exchange serial notes registered with the bank and transferable by
change of registry; and this serial note issue, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held, was composed of "instruments... known generally
as corporate securities." There are obvious dissimilarities of fact in the
two cases, notably the circumstances that the instruments in the Bellefield
case were intended to be given and were given to the bank extending the
line of credit whereas in the Royal Loan case they were given existing
creditors as a device to assure the priority of the bank's claim; but in the
essentials of lack of public distribution, general character of the financing
scheme (procurement of a line of bank credit), and the formal expres-
sion of the resultant obligation in promissory notes, they are identical. 40
Ordinarily an instrument expressing the promissory obligation of
an individual will not be one which is commonly regarded as a corporate
security. 7 The rate of tax is, moreover, so slight that avoidance of docu-
mentary stamp tax liability will rarely move a corporation to indulge in
elaborate hocus-pocus to mask its operations as those of individuals, al-
though conceivably if other business advantages are in equipoise, such
tax avoidance might be just enough of a makeweight to determine the
preferred procedure. Still, for divers reasons of varying legitimacy, there
has been a growing practise in real estate financing particularly of em-
ploying "straw men,"'4 who, for record purposes, stand as the promisors
upon whose undertakings lenders rely in advancing funds on the security
of real property. In such cases, is the series of notes or bonds signed by
the straw man under which funds are advanced to the corporation
(which moreover will ordinarily by contract of guaranty or other col-
lateral agreement have placed its credit behind the loan) properly
describable as instruments "known generally as corporate securities?"
As The opinion extends the customary professional courtesy of attempting to
distinguish the Bellefield case on the ground that that decision had gone off on
the lack of registry or interest coupons, see 154 F. (2d) 558; but while those
formal details were alluded to in the Bellefield case, see 25 F. (2d) 562, it was at
an intermediate state of the discussion and the conclusion was rested on a classi-
fication of the instruments as "notes" rather than "bonds," partly but only partly
because of the interest coupon-registry angle.
47 Cf. National Commercial Title & Guaranty Co. v. Kelly, 39 F. Supp. 339
(D. N.J. 1941) (holding not subject to tax mortgages by individuals to corpora-
tion upon their subsequent assignment to other holders coupled with corporate
guaranty); Mutual Building & Savings Association v. Wilkinson, 8 F. (2d) 183
(E.D. Wis. 1925) (instrument given by borrower-member of building and loan
association to the association held not taxable under Revenue Act of 1917).
48 For a useful discussion of the question generally, consult Cook, Straw Men
in Real Estate Transactions (1940) 25 WAsH. U. L. Q. 232.
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On this issue the two reported cases'9 are in square disagreement. What-
ever one's final judgment as to the appropriate result, it is well to note
that this is merely one special technique by which outside funds are made
available to and for the purposes of the -corporation hovering ostenta-
tiously in back of the straw man.
The fortuitous circumstance that the issuer was an individual has
misled courts in a few cases 0 involving receivers' certificates to suggest it
as a reason for rejecting the contention that the certificates were taxable.
Aside from the fact that a "straw man" and a receiver normally are both
natural persons, however, they have little in common nor has either one
very much likeness institutionally to an individual entrepreneur. Only
by yielding to an arid verbalism does one seem compelled to hold the situ-
ations to be identical or even significantly comparable. The receiver and
his certificate are exemplars rather of a fairly extensive group of issuers
and issues, namely, those connected with the liquidation or reorganiza-
tion of down-at-the-heel corporations.
Up to this point, we have been interested in the paper of golden
dreams-the instrument by which financial genius come to blossom in a
management corporation has been going to make everyone rich or at
least comfortably secure by getting the use of his money. But there is also
the cold gray dawn of the morning after. The corporation has flourished;
investors have confided their funds to it; then it falls on evil days and,
either voluntarily or by governmental direction, confesses its inability to
repay, at least at once and in full. To salvage as much as possible, a re-
ceiver is appointed by the appropriate court or creditors get together and
designate a protective committee or the corporation itself turns over its
assets to a trustee for creditors or to a successor corporation established to
aid in orderly liquidation. As evidence of the interests of the old creditors,
statements are given them of the balance to their credit with contingent
promises of payment; or, if the corporation is a public utility obliged to
continue its service, trustees' certificates in satisfaction of accruing claims
or receivers' certificates to obtain working capital for day to day opera-
tion are issued pursuant to court authorization. Very generally courts
have held such evidences of claims against stricken corporations not to be
subject to the documentary stamp tax, whether issued by natural per-
40 Central States Life Insurance Co. v. Sheehan, 117 F. (2d) 46 (C. C. A. 8th,
1941) (instruments held taxable). Contra: Mitten Bank Securities Corp. v. United
States, 24 F. Supp. 198 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
GO See United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 753 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); In re
Follansbee Brothers Co., 42 F. Supp. 449 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
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sons5 l or by corporations,5 2 by receivers,"8 trustees,5 4 creditors' commit-
tees,r 5 successor corporations, 0 or the original corporation, 7 and
whether the instruments are certificates for the balance of loans and in-
vestments theretofore entrusted to the corporation, 5 for currently accru-
ing operating expenses,59 or for funds borrowed to meet such expenses.00
In so doing, they have furthered the spirit of legislative 1 and adminis-
trative 2 exemptions from taxation expressly accorded in a somewhat
5L United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938) ; Stewart v.
Moore, 43 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ohio 1940) ; In re Follansbee Brothers Company,
42 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Pa. 1940).52 Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Company v. United States, 27 F.
Supp. 206 (D. Md. 1939); Sterling v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 488 (D. Md.
1939).
53 United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
06 Stewart v. Moore, 43 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ohio 1940); In re Follansbee
Brothers Company, 42 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
65 Cf. In re Follansbee Brothers Company, 42 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Pa. 1940)
(point raised by petition but not passed on because moot).
50 Consolidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co. v. United States, 27 F. Supp.
206 (D. Md. 1939).
57 Sterling v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 488 (D. Md. 1939).58 In re Follansbee Brothers Co., 42 F. Supp. 448 (W.D. Pa. 1940); Con-
solidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co. v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 206 (D.
Md. 1939); Sterling v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 488 (D. Md. 1939).59-Stewart v. Moore, 43 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
00 United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).
61 With respect to insolvent banks and trust companies, assessment of taxes
having the effect of diminishing the assets available to satisfy claims of depositors
was forbidden and restoration of all sums paid on account of such taxes was
directed by the Act of March 1, 1879, 52 STAT. 579, which was, in United States
v. Sterling, 106 F. (2d) 178 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) and in United States v. Con.
solidated Gas Electric Light & Power Co., 108 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940)
made the express ground of affirmance of decisions, see cases cited supra note 53,
exempting transactions from the documentary stamp tax, without passing on the
District Court's view that the instruments were not "known generally as corporate
securities." Subsequent to the transactions out of which the claimed tax liability
in those cases arose, the statutory provisions as to the documentary stamp tax
were amended to exempt securities transactions in connection with the reorganiza-
tion of railroads under Section 77 of the National Bankruptcy Act and corporate
reorganizations under Section 77B of said Act. see 44 STAT. 1474 (1933), 48 STAT.
919 (1934), which provisions have been later amended and somewhat broadened
to apply to railroad and corporate reorganizations and to transactions pursuant
to orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission under section 11 (b) of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, see 56 STAT. 959 (1942), the provisions now
appearing as Internal Revenue Code, §1808 (e), (f). Simultaneously with. the
more recent amendment, §1801, Internal Revenue Code, was amended by adding
a provision that "Obligations described in this section issued by any receiver,
trustee in bankruptcy, assignee, or other person, having custody of property
or charge of the affairs, of any corporation, shall, for the purposes of this
chapter, be deemed to be issued by the corporation," a provision which seems
aimed at preventing the accrual of any immunity on account of the circumstance
that the formal obligor is an individual, without otherwise affecting the question
of the character of the instrument itself.
02 For a summary of pertinent administrative regulations, see the discussion in
United States v. Sterling, 106 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) and in.United
States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938). The portion of Regulation
71 currently in effect and relevant is set forth supra, note 23.
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special and limited group of cases and have on occasion purported to be
applying such legislation or regulations, as indeed they may on occasion
have been doing. However that may be, the contrast between the prev-
alent tendency to tax instruments of miscellaneous types used by operat-
ing financial corporations to tap sources of funds for purposes of business
expansion and the even more general agreement 3 on exemption of in-
struments used to facilitate the liquidation or reorganization of ailing
enterprises is marked.
Thus ends the examination of the results of the cases. In rough
profile, they present a picture of liability whenever the instruments,
whatever their form and whatever the technical legal status of the
corporation with reference to them, were calculated to induce a flow of
funds or a grant of credit to a corporation so as to enable it to enlarge its
own operations (ordinarily in the financing field) and of non-liability
whenever they served some other purpose, such as acknowledgment of
sums due for claims arising out of prior or current transactions or re-
ceipts for part payment of a purchase price. To phrase the matter yet
more simply, it is a question of contrast between investment and non-
investment instruments. True, on no situation is their judicial unanimity;
but it is perhaps significant that, aside from one Court of Claims deci-
sion,84 all of the cases" exempting issuance of investment paper from the
documentary stamp tax have been decisions arising in the Third Circuit
-a Circuit whose view on this specific issue of "insr ments ... known
generally as corporate securities" was rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Lederer v. Fidelity Trust Company. In this Circuit, it
may further be noted, there is, except for one late case 6 involving a car
equipment trust certificate and so squarely governed by Lederer v. Fidel-
ity Trust Company, no instance where eccentric investment paper
spawned by corporations has been held to be "known generally as
corporate securities." Moreover, the marked bias of the Circuit is--or
03 But cf. National Commercial Title & Guaranty Co. v. Kelly, 39 F. Supp. 339
(D. N.J. 1941) (extension of mortgage participation certificates issued by in-
solvent mortgage guarantee company though in conformity with plan proposed by
state Commissioner of Banking and Insurance held taxable renewal).04 Fidelity Investment Association v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 789, 5 F. Supp.
19 (1933), cited supra note 39; cfi. General Motors Acceptance Corporation v.
Higgins, 60 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. N.Y. 1945), cited supra note 34.
Or Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. United States, 80 F. (2d) 893 (C. C. A. 3d,
1935) reversing 9 F. Supp. 257 (M.D. Pa. 1935), cited supra note 31; Bellefield
Co. v. Heiner, 25 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) reversing 26 F. (2d) 292(W.D. Pa. 1928), cited supra note 43; Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on
Lives and Granting Annuities v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Pa.. 1941),
cited supra note 31; Mitten Bank Securities Corporation v. United States, 24
Supp. 198 (ED. Pa. 1938).
68 Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and Granting Annuities v.
Rothensies, 146 F. (2d) 148 (C. C. A. 3d, 1944) cited supra note 28.
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perhaps it would be fairer to say was until recently-to give a restrictive
construction in stamp tax cases generally, so that, not only in Lederer v.
Fidelity Trust Company but also in Raybestos Manhattan Company v.
United States,67 the United States Supreme Court disapproved doctrines
entertained in that Circuit in favor of exemptions from the documentary
stamp tax. Upon an inspection of the results, one seems therefore to see
a general concurrence on the investment character of the instrument as
the principal criterion of taxability under the "known generally" clause,
opposed only by a special Third Circuit jurisprudence stubbornly resist-
ant s8 to taxability beyond the ambit of bonds, debentures, and cer-
tificates of indebtedness technically delimited.
There has been no discussion of the legal doctrine proclaimed in
support of the results and none is proposed. Its absence traces to no con-
viction that such materials are valueless, either generally (indeed, for
some purposes, such as that of persuasion, they are immensely import-
ant) or in this specific matter (indeed, animated and excellent doc-
trinal discussion is found in some of the opinions).'D But the writer if
firmly convinced that opinions are but the navigational buoys of the law
which, while designed and useful as channel markers to aid counsel in
safely steering his client's cause through the shoal waters of tax law,
should always be used with the caution that
In taking bearings, it must be borne in mind that the buoys are
floating guides'and while they are restricted by their anchor chains
to the minimum movement consistent with the rise and fall of the
tide in the locality in which they are placed, they are not absolutely
67 296 U. S. 60,56 S. Ct. 63, 80 L. ed. 44 (1935), affirming 80 Ct. Cl. 809, 10 F.
Supp. 130 (1935). The opinion by Mr. Justice Stone opens with the statement,
"In this case we granted certiorari to review a judgment of the Court of Claims,
to settle a doubtful point of federal law, of importance in the administration of the
revenue acts, and to resolve a conflict of the decision below with that of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in MacLaughlin v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 73
F. (2d) 1004, affirming 8 F. Supp. 963 . . ." Afflirmance of the Court of Claims
decision necessarily involved rejection of the Third Circuit rule that under the
circumstances presented, not here material to be discussed, there was no liability
on account of the documentary stamp tax.
68 In fairness to the Third Circuit, one should observe that all the restrictive
constructions of the statute were prior to the decision in Ladner v. Pennroad
Corporatibn, 97 F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) reversing 21 F. Supp. 575 (E.D.
Pa. 1937) and cert. denied 305 U. S. 618, 59 S. Ct. 78, 83 L. ed. 394 (1938), in
which the Circuit Court of Appeals used language favoring a broad construction
of the statute and reached a result making for taxability. Since then, interpreta-
tion of the statute has not been before the court, so that one may if optimistically
inclined regard the case as a harbinger of a new attitude toward stamp tax
problems.69 The opinions in Motter v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., 93 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A.
10th, 1937), Willcuts v. Investors Syndicate, 57 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932)
and Royal Loan Co. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Mo. 1945) contain
particularly illuminating discussions. The devotees of doctrinal discussion will at
any rate find this article affords them a comprehensive check list of the materials.
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accurate marks. If landmarks are available they should not be dis-
regarded, even though one or more buoys may be relatively close.70
What then has observation of the fixed landmarks of case results indi-
cated as the probable true position with respect to taxability, under sec-
tion 1801,71 of unorthodox instruments of corporate parentage?
Briefly these propositions, it is believed:
(1) Car equipment trust certificates are taxable;
(2) So are mortgage participation certificates (if the structure of
the present Treasury Regulation 7172 is considered as indicating a con-
trary result, the courts may and indeed should disregard the Regulation
pro tanto7 ) ;
(3) So is any other instrument issued serially in convenient con-
ventional denominations as a part of a scheme for inducing investors to
supply funds or credit for projected corporate operations;"'
(4) But no instrument not falling within the description of clause
(3)--of which clauses (1) and (2) are but special instances-is, within
the statutory contemplation, an instrument "known generally as (a)
corporate securit(y)."
(5) Whether an instrument purports to be the obligation of a
corporation or of an individual, functioning as receiver, assignee, or
70 DUTTON, NAvIGATION AND NAUTICAL ASRONOMY (7th. ed. 1942) 170.
71 Also governing as to INT. REv. CODE, §3481, which imposes a companion tax
on account of transfer "of legal title to any of the instruments mentioned or
described in section 1801 and of a kind the issue of which is taxable there-
under..."
72 See the language of art. 56 (h), quoted supra note 23.
72 In the words of Wilbur, Circuit Judge, concurring in Welch v. Kerckhoff,
84 F. (2d) 300 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936), in a decision involving another aspect of
the documentary stamp tax, "The statute having provided for the tax the regu-
lations of the Treasury Department could not relieve the transferee of the obliga-
tion imposed by the statute;" cf. United States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 754 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1938). Note that the current provision of the Regulations and the imme-
diately preceding one, quoted supra note 22 are diametrically opposed, so that
either the Department acted beyond its statutory authority in promulgating one or
the other or else the statutory language, conceiving that it would allow both results,
is wholly meaningless and inoperative. On the basis of the authorities discussed in
this article, it is submitted that the first formulation was the correct one which
the Department should restore or the courts retain.
71 Unless the instrument have the formal characteristics referred to, it would
not be similar to any of those which have been held taxable and probably in
common understanding would not be regarded as a corporate security. It is also
highly probable that the instrument must have been issued with interest coupons
attached or, alternatively, in registered form or both. Instruments issued with
interest coupons apparently present too clear a case and have not come before the
courts; but there has been much obscure disagreement as to what provisions bring
the registry provision into play. Compare the terms and conditions set out with
respect to the instrument in Willcuts v. Investors Syndicate, 57 F. (2d) 811 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1932) with those of the instruments in General Motors Acceptance
Corporation v. Higgins, 60 F. Supp. 979 (S.D. N.Y. 1945).
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otherwise, is immaterial, except as noted in clause (6). As to all instru-
ments not covered by thl exception, the tests for taxability depend on
the nature of the instrument and the transaction in the manner stated
in the first four clauses. 75
(6) Instruments issued in connection with certain railroad or
corporate reorganizations or in effectuating orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under section 11 (b) of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act are exempt on account of the nature of the transaction,"'
whatever the character of the instrument or the issuer.
75 Accordingly it would seem that a situation such as that involved in United
States v. Powell, 95 F. (2d) 752 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938), cited supra note 61, would
not now be exempt from the tax unless it could be brought within the provisions
of section 1808 (c).
78 INT. REV. CODE, §1808 (e), (f).
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